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I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent turmoil in the financial markets related to rising default rates on subprime home purchase loans1 should not obscure the fact that study after study has
shown African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods2 receive a disproportionately high percentage of subprime home purchase
loans.3 Not only do African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly
This study looks at home purchase loans and subprime home purchase loans. A home purchase loan is
a first-lien, conventional loan secured by and made for the purpose of purchasing a one- to four-family,
owner-occupied dwelling. 12 C.F.R. § 203.2(h) (2008). A subprime home purchase loan has an interest
rate that is three percentage points or more higher than the interest rate on the treasury bill of comparable
maturity. Id. § 203.4(a)(12) (requiring a lender to report the difference between a loan's interest rate
and the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity, and a difference equal to or
greater than three percentage points for loans secured by a first lien on a dwelling).
2.

For purposes of this essay these groups are defined as follows: an African-American person has origins
in any of the black racial groups of Africa. FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, HDMA 2004:
REVISIONS TO REGULATION C, at 7 (2004). A Latino person is of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican,
South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race. Id. A predominantly
minority neighborhood is a neighborhood with a racial composition of 80% minority or higher.

3

See Robert B. Avery, Kenneth Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES.
BULL. A73, A75, A94-96 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 HMDA Data]; Robert B. Avery & Glenn B. Canner,
New Information Reported Under HMDA and Its Application in FairLending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES.
BULL. 344 (2005); WILLIAM C. APGAR, JR. & CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. &
URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME LENDING AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS:

(2006); U.S.

REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES

DEP'T OF

Hous.

A

LITERATURE

& URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN:

IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA

(2000) [hereinafter HUD
ACORN, SEPARATE

REPORT], availableat http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/unequal-full.pdf;

(2004), availableat http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/
and E 2004/separate and unequal_2004.pdf; DEBBIE

AND UNEQUAL: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA

CommunityReinvestment/Reports/S

GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., THE CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT

OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES

responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rrOll-UnfairLending-0506.pdf;
REVITALIZATION

(2006), available at http://www.

CALVIN BRADFORD, NEIGHBORHOOD

PROJECT OF THE CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, RISK OR RACE? RACIAL DISPARITIES

(2002), available at http://www.butera-andrews com/
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Report.pdf; CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL. ET AL., PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM: A MULTISTATE ANALYSIS OF HIGHER COST HOME PURCHASE LENDING (2007), available at http://www.
AND THE SUBPRIME REFINANCE MARKET
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IN
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GREATER
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2005 (2007), available at http://site.www.umb.edu/gastonwebsite/articles/BT7-Jan07-final%20web.pdf; DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., Two STEPS BACK:
MASSACHUSETTS,

THE DUAL
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MARKET, PREDATORY

LENDING,

AND

THE UNDOING

OF
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DEVELOPMENT (1999), available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/publications/research-reports/5/55/

date/DESC/;

NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., THE 2004 FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES: STUBBORN

AND PERSISTENT (2005)

[hereinafter

2004 FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES], available at

org/images/stories/pdf/research/ncrc%2O20042Ohmdas2Oreport.pdf;

http://www.ncrc.

NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT

II (2006), available at
http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/pdf/research/ncrc%/22005%20hmda%/20report.pdf; NAT'L CMTY.
REINVESTMENT COAL., THE CRA AND FAIR LENDING PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA (2006), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter
COAL., THE 2005 FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES: STUBBORN AND PERSISTENT

reports/ncrcs20phillyo20report
DISPARITIES BY RACE,

5_06.pdf;

NAT'L

CMTY. REINVESTMENT
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FAIR LENDING

AREAS IN AMERICA

(2005),

available at http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press-releases/documents/2005/FairlenddisparityMarch05.pdf;

NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., INCOME

DIFFERENCES IN LENDING:
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Is No SHIELD AGAINST RACIAL

COMPARISON OF HIGH-COST LENDING IN AMERICA1S METROPOLITAN
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minority neighborhoods receive disproportionately high numbers of subprime home
purchase loans, they also have traditionally received a disproportionately low number
4
of all home purchase loans.

Disproportionately high subprime lending and disproportionately low home
mortgage lending to African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly
minority neighborhoods create a triple negative impact on homeownership among
these populations and communities: homeownership is less likely, less valuable, and
less likely to be sustained for these groups compared with whites 5 and residents of
6
predominantly white neighborhoods.
As of 2004, 75.7% of white families owned their own homes, compared with
49.5% of African-American families, 7 and as of March 2005, 49.7% of Latino families owned their homes.8 African-Americans and Latinos thus do not enjoy the
benefits of homeownership-including protection from the unpredictable rental
housing market; financial stability; a source of capital for starting a business, financing an education, or making a loan to children; and a vehicle for passing wealth
from one generation to the next-to the same degree as whites. This helps explain

our country's wealth gap: as of 2002, white families had, on average, nearly fifteen
times the assets of African-American families and nine times the assets of Latino
(2007), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter
metro%20study%20race%20and%20income%20disparity%20july%2007.pdf;
AREAS

reports/ncrc%20
NAT'L

CMTY.

REINVESTMENT COAL., PREAPPROVALS AND PRICING DISPARITIES IN THE MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE:

A NCRC

FOLLOW-UP REPORT FOR NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP MONTH (2005); NAT'L CMTY.

REINVESTMENT

COAL., THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA & POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH COUNCIL,

(2006), availableathttp://www.opportunityagenda.
org/atf/cf/%7B2ACB2581-1559-47D6-8973 70CD23C286CB%7D/Subprime%20Lending%20Report.
HOMEOWNERSHIP AND WEALTH BUILDINGIMPEDED

PDF; NCRC Fair Lending Testing Reveals Discriminationby Mortgage Brokers, REINVESTMENT WORKS
(Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal.), Summer 2006, at 1; New Mortgage PricingData Shields Light on
Subrime Market, REINVESTMENT ALERT, (Woodstock Inst.), May 2005.

4.

SeeJiM CAMPEN, CHANGING PATTERNS

XIV: MORTGAGE LENDING TO TRADITIONALLY UNDERSERVED

(2008);
3, at 3; Richard D.
Marsico, New York MetropolitanArea Lending Scorecard 1998, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 769 (2000);
Richard D. Marsico, Patterns of Lending to Low-Income and Minority Persons and Neighborhoods: The
1999 New York MetropolitanArea MortgageLending Scorecard, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 199 (2001);
Richard D. Marsico, Shedding Some Light on Lending: The Effect of Expanded Disclosure Laws on Home
Mortgage Marketing,Lending, andDiscriminationin the New York MetropolitanArea, 27 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 481 (1999); Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 53,
66-67 (2006).
BORROWERS & NEIGHBORHOODS IN BOSTON, GREATER BOSTON AND MASSACHUSETTS, 2006
NAT'L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., 2004 FAIR LENDING DISPARITIES, supra note

5.

For purposes of this essay, a white person has origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the
Middle East, or North Africa and is not a person of American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or
African-American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or Hispanic or Latino culture or origin.
FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 6-7.

6.

For purposes of this essay, a predominantly white neighborhood as a neighborhood whose racial
composition is less than 20% minority.

7.

Shapiro, supra note 4, at 65.

8.

Press Release, Cong. Hispanic Caucus Inst., Hispanic Homeownership Barriers Start to Fall (Sept. 12,
2005).
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families.9 Even when African-Americans and Latinos own homes, they disproportionately pay more for their loans, reducing the value of their homes, and further
contributing to the wealth gap.1
Subprime loans have higher foreclosure rates than prime loans.11 Concentrations
of subprime loans in particular neighborhoods lead to higher foreclosure rates and
negative collateral effects in those neighborhoods such as disinvestment, deterioration, and increased crime rates.2 To the extent that predominantly minority
neighborhoods receive disproportionately high percentages of subprime loans, they
are more likely to face high foreclosure rates and the consequent harm. For example,
a study of Los Angeles from 2001-2004 shows that 45% of all foreclosures were in
predominantly minority neighborhoods and that overall, foreclosures occurred twelve
times more often in predominantly minority neighborhoods than in predominantly
13
white neighborhoods.
14
Data made public pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
about home purchase lending in New York City in 2006 shows that New York City
is no exception to the national prime and subprime lending trends.1" AfricanAmericans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods received
disproportionately higher percentages of subprime home purchase loans than whites
and residents of predominantly white neighborhoods. Several individual lenders
contributed to these disparities by making disproportionately high percentages of
subprime home purchase loans to African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods. This essay illustrates these disparities by
providing an analysis of the aggregate lending practices 16 and individual lending
practices in New York City in 2006, and offers a brief analysis of this data as it relates to disparate treatment of minority groups and the possibilities of reforming
subprime lending practices.

9.

Shapiro, supra note 4, at 63 n.51 (reporting that in 2002, the net worth of white households was $88,651,
Latino households was $7932, and African-American households was $5988).

10.

Id. at 67 (reporting that African-Americans pay approximately $12,000 more for an average thirty-year
mortgage than whites).

11.

BRADFORD,

supra note 3, at vi; 2006 HMDA Data, supra note 3, at A76, A102-08; Vikas Bajaj, More

Trouble in Subprime Mortgages, N.Y. TIMEs, June 15, 2007, at Cl.

12.

See BRADFORD, supra note 3, at vi-vii; Elvin K. Wyly et al., Low- to Moderate-IncomeLending in Context:
ProgressReport on the NeighborhoodImpacts ofHomeownership Policy, 12 Hous. POL'Y DEBATE 87 (2001).

13.

Shapiro, supra note 4, at 70-71.

14.

12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2006).

15.

See 2006 Peer Mortgage Data Northeast Region (PCi Corporation CRA Wiz and Fair Lending Wiz
CD-ROM, Version 6.6). The source of the HMDA data in this paper is the CRA Wiz and Fair
Lending Wiz CD-ROM.

16.

For the purposes of this essay, "aggregate lending" is combined lending by all lenders who reported
HMDA data for New York City in 2006.
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II. AGGREGATE LENDING IN NEW YORK CITY IN 2006

Overall, African-Americans and Latinos in New York City in 2006 had lower
market shares of home purchase loans than subprime home purchase loans, and the
reverse was true for whites. The pattern was similar for residents of predominantly
minority neighborhoods: they also had a lower market share of home purchase loans
than subprime home purchase loans, while residents of predominantly white neighborhoods enjoyed the reverse. In addition, the percentages of all home purchase
loans that African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority
neighborhoods received that were subprime were higher than the percentages received by whites and residents of predominantly white neighborhoods that were
subprime.
A. Market Share ofHome PurchaseLoans Compared with Market Share of
Subprime Home PurchaseLoans: The DisparityIndex
The percentage of all home purchase loans a particular group received-also
known as the group's market share-compared with its market share of subprime
home purchase loans, should ideally be identical. The greater the difference in the
two market shares, the greater the disparate treatment; unfavorable treatment is indicated when the group's market share of all home purchase loans is smaller than its
market share of subprime home purchase loans. It is possible to develop this analysis
further and calculate the home purchase loan market share/subprime home purchase
loan market share ratio for a particular group and compare it with the ratio for another group. This comparison yields a disparity index, which is the ratio of the two
groups' individual ratios. For example, if the ratio of white borrowers' market share
of home purchase loans to subprime home purchase loans is two and the ratio of
African-American borrowers' market share of home purchase loans to subprime
home purchase loans is one-half, the magnitude of the difference-the disparity index-between whites and African-Americans is four.
African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods had smaller market shares of all home purchase loans than subprime purchase
loans; the reverse was true for whites and residents of predominantly white neighborhoods. These results yielded disparity indices that were favorable to whites and
residents of predominantly white neighborhoods and unfavorable to AfricanAmericans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods.
African-Americans received 17.6% of all home purchase loans and 38.8% of all
subprime home purchase loans, a ratio of 0.5. In contrast, whites received 36.4% of
all home purchase loans and 17.0% of all subprime home purchase loans, a ratio of
2.1. This yields a disparity index of 4.2.
Latinos received 13.8% of all home purchase loans and 22.2% of all subprime
home purchase loans, a ratio of 0.6. In contrast, as described above, the ratio for
whites was 2.1. This yields a disparity index of 3.5.
Residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods received 37.9% of all home
purchase loans and 69.7% of all subprime home purchase loans, a ratio of 0.5. In
101S
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contrast, residents of predominantly white neighborhoods received 17.5% of all home
purchase loans and 5.7% of all subprime home purchase loans, a ratio of 3.1. This
yields a disparity index of 6.2.
These results are depicted on the following chart:

Ratio: Market Share of
Market Share of
Home Purchase

AfricanAmericans

Market Share of Home Purchase Loans to
Subprime Home Market Share of Subprime Disparity

Loans

Purchase Loans

Loans

Index

17.6%

38.8%

0.5

4.7

13.8%

22.2%

0.6

3.5

36.4%

17.0%

2.1

N/A

37.9%

69.7%

0.5

6.2

17.5%

5.7%

3.1

N/A

Latinos
Whites
Predominantly
Minority
Neighborhoods
Predominantly
White
Neighborhoods

B. PercentageofLoans Received That Were Subprime
The percentage of home purchase loans that a particular group received that were
subprime can be compared with the percentage another group received to measure
the magnitude of differential treatment. For example, if 50% of all home purchase
loans that African-Americans received were subprime and 10% of all home purchase
loans that whites received were subprime, African-American borrowers were five
times more likely than whites to receive a subprime home purchase loan.
Overall, African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority
neighborhoods were much more likely to receive subprime home purchase loans than
whites and residents of predominantly white neighborhoods.
Slightly more than half of all home purchase loans to African-Americans (50.5%)
were subprime. Only 10.7% of all home purchase loans to whites were subprime.
African-Americans were 4.7 times more likely than whites to receive subprime
loans.
Nearly 37% of all home purchase loans to Latinos were subprime. This was 3.4
times higher than the 10.7% of all home purchase loans to whites that were subprime. Latinos were over three times more likely than whites to receive subprime
loans.
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Over 42% of all home purchase loans to residents of predominantly minority
neighborhoods were subprime. Only 7.5% of all home purchase loans to residents of
predominantly white neighborhoods were subprime. Residents of predominantly
minority neighborhoods were 5.8 times more likely than residents of predominantly
white neighborhoods to receive subprime home purchase loans.
The following charts summarize these results:

AfricanAmericans

50.5%

% of all Loans
that were
Subprime

Whites

Ratio: AfricanAmericans to
Whites

Latinos

Ratio: Latinos
to Whites

10.7%

4.7

36.9%

3.4

Predominantly
Minority
Neighborhoods

Predominantly White
Neighborhoods

Ratio

42.2%

7.5%

5.8

% of all Loans that
were Subprime

III. INDIVIDUAL LENDERS

Although there are several hundred home mortgage lenders in New York City, a
relatively small number of them control more than half of the home mortgage loan
market. The top ten home purchase loan lenders in 2006 made 34,000 loans-58%
of all home purchase loans. The ten lenders who made the most subprime home
purchase loans in 2006 made 8050 subprime home purchase loans-64.3% of all
subprime loans. More than half of these lenders made disproportionately high numbers of subprime home purchase loans to African-Americans, Latinos, and residents
of predominantly minority neighborhoods. This disproportionality is shown by
using one of two criteria: either 1) a disproportionately high percentage of the lender's home purchase loans were subprime home purchase loans made to each of these
groups or 2) the percentage of all the home purchase loans the lender made to a particular group that was subprime was disproportionately high.
The difference between these two criteria is subtle but important. The first criterion uses the total number of home purchase loans the lender made as the
denominator of the fraction and the total number of subprime home purchase loans
it made to a particular group as the numerator of the fraction. This fraction is the
percentage of the lender's total number of home purchase loans that were subprime
loans to the particular group. The second criterion uses the total number of home
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purchase loans the lender made to a particular group as the denominator and the
number of subprime home purchase loans it made to the group as the numerator.
This fraction is the percentage of home loans made to the particular group that were
subprime.
The difference between the two criteria captures different groups of lenders.
The first criterion generally captures lenders that specialize in subprime lending.
Because virtually all of their loans are subprime, nearly all borrowers who receive a
home purchase loan from these lenders receive a subprime loan. In order to determine whether such a subprime loan specialist is making a disproportionately high
percentage of subprime loans to a particular group, it is necessary to compare the
percentages of all the home purchase loans the lender made that were subprime loans
to African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods to the percentages made to whites and residents of predominantly white
neighborhoods and to the aggregate percentages.
The second criterion generally captures lenders that do not specialize in subprime lending. Because the percentage of all their home purchase loans that are
subprime is generally small, the percentage of all these lenders' home purchase loans
that are subprime to any particular group is also relatively small. In order to determine whether one of these lenders is making a disproportionately high number of
subprime loans to any particular group, it is necessary to determine the percentage of
the home purchase loans they make to a particular group that are subprime and compare it to the percentages they make to other groups.
A. PercentageofAll Home PurchaseLoans the Lender Made That Were Suhprime
The percentages of all home purchase loans that eight high-volume lenders made
that were subprime home purchase loans to African-Americans and Latinos were
disproportionately high. The percentages were higher than the aggregate percentages to each group and higher than each lender's percentage to whites. The following
chart shows, for each of the eight lenders, the percentage of all home purchase loans
it made that were subprime home purchase loans to African-Americans, Latinos,
and whites. It also shows the ratio of the lender's percentages to African-Americans
and Latinos to the aggregate percentages.
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AfricanAmericans

Ratio: Lender to
Aggregate

Latinos

Ratio: Lender to
Aggregate

Whites

Fremont

45.3%

5.1

19.6%

3.8

11.2%

WMC

39.5%

4.4

23.5%

4.6

15.3%

4.2

13.1%

Lender

New Century

40.3%

4.5

21.5%

National City

36.6%

4.1

17.4%

3.4

11.9%

Option One

43.7%

4.9

23.9%

4.7

14.3%

Argent

31.6%

3.6

19.1%

3.7

27.9%

Accredited
Home

31.4%

3.5

21.6%

4.2

16.9%

Long Beach

43.5%

4.9

25.6%

5.0

12.1%

1

Thus, for example, 45.3% of all home purchase loans that Fremont made were
subprime home purchase loans to African-Americans. This figure is 5.1 times higher
that the aggregate percentage and 3.8 times higher than Freemont's percentage of
subprime home purchase loans made to whites (11.2%).
The percentages of nine high-volume lenders' home purchase loans that were
subprime home purchase loans to residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods were disproportionately high. The percentages were higher than their
percentages to predominantly white neighborhoods and higher than the aggregate
percentage. The following chart shows, for each of the nine lenders, the percentage
of all home purchase loans they made that were subprime home purchase loans to
residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods and predominantly white neighborhoods. It also shows the ratio of each lender's percentage to the aggregate
percentage.

Lender

Minority
Neighborhoods

Ratio: Lender to
Aggregate

White
Neighborhoods

Fremont

71.5%

4.5

4.4%

WMC

70.6%

4.4

5.3%

New Century

65.7%

4.1

3.7%

National City

60.5%

3.8

4.3%

Option One

65.9%

4.1

6.8%

Indymac

21.4%

1.3

2.5%

Argent

65 .4%

4.1

4.9%

Accredited Home

64.7%

4.0

2.4%

Long Beach

75.9%

4.7

3.8%
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Thus, for example, 75.9% of all home purchase loans that Long Beach made
were subprime home purchase loans to residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods. This figure is 4.7 times higher than the aggregate percentage and 20
times higher than the 3.8% Long Beach made to residents of predominantly white
neighborhoods.

B. Percentage ofAll Home PurchaseLoans the Lender Made That Were Subprime
The percentage of all home purchase loans that six high-volume lenders made to
African-Americans and Latinos that were subprime were significantly higher than
their percentages to whites. The following chart shows the percentage of all home
purchase loans each lender made to African-Americans, Latinos, and whites that
were subprime and the ratio of each lender's percentages of home purchase loans to
African-Americans and Latinos that were subprime to its percentages of home purchase loans to whites that were subprime.
Ratio:
Lender

JP Morgan Chase
Citimortgage
Wells Fargo
HSBC
Countrywide
Greenpoint

AfricanAmericans

AfricanAmericans to
Whites

Latinos

Ratio: Latinos
to Whites

Whites

15.6%
1.7%
23.0%
2.6%
33.7%
19.7%

5.6
5.7
17.7
6.4
3.3
3.9

12.4%
1.6%
10.9%
2.3%
18.4%
14.3%

4.5
4.9
8.4
5.7
1.8
2.9

2.8%
0.3%
1.3%
0.4%
10.8%
5.0%

1

Thus, for example, African-Americans were 17.7 times more likely and Latinos were
8.4 times more likely than whites to receive a subprime home purchase loan from
Wells Fargo.
The same six lenders showed a similar trend in their lending practices to residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods compared with residents of
predominantly white neighborhoods. The following chart shows the percentage of
all home purchase loans each lender made to residents of predominantly minority
neighborhoods and residents of predominantly white neighborhoods that were subprime, and the ratio of this percentage to the lender's percentage of home purchase
loans to residents of predominantly white neighborhoods that were subprime.
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Lender

Minority
Neighborhoods

White
Neighborhoods

Ratio: Minority to White
Neighborhoods

JP Morgan Chase

13.0%

1.5%

8.7

Citimortgage

1.1%

0.2%

7.4

Wells Fargo

12.0%

1.2%

10.0

HSBC

1.6%

0.5%

3.2

Countrywide

31.8%

7.6%

4.2

Greenpoint

17.5%

4.4%

4.0

Thus, for example, residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods were ten
times more likely than residents of predominantly white neighborhoods to receive
subprime home purchase loans from Wells Fargo.
IV. MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE HMDA DATA

The 2006 HMDA data show that, in New York City, African-Americans,
Latinos, and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods received significantly higher percentages of subprime home purchase loans than whites and residents
of predominantly white neighborhoods. The data also show that several of the largest
lenders in New York City made disproportionately high percentages of subprime
home purchase loans to African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of predominantly
minority neighborhoods.
Two important questions arise from these findings. First, does the data demonstrate that lenders are discriminating against African-Americans, Latinos, and
residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods? Second, are these results relevant in developing solutions to the subprime lending crisis? If so, how?
A. DiscriminatoryTreatment
Regarding lending discrimination, the HMDA data alone is not sufficient to
allow a conclusion that these racial disparities are the result of illegal discrimination.
This is because HMDA data lack information about borrower creditworthinessmost importantly the borrower's credit score-that is necessary to reach such a
conclusion.17 Without information about a borrower's creditworthiness, it is difficult

to determine whether a borrower who received a subprime home purchase loan was
eligible for a prime loan. And without this information, it is difficult to determine if
a lender is treating similarly situated borrowers differently based on race, which is
the essence of discrimination. Despite these shortcomings in the HMDA data, the
disparities are in some instances so large that they invite action by government enforcement agencies that have access to the necessary data and by private parties who

17.

2006 HMDA Data, supra note 3, at A99.
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have the right to commence administrative or judicial litigation alleging discrimination and can obtain the necessary data in discovery.
Nevertheless, despite some noteworthy exceptions, government investigation and
enforcement has been sluggish. Exceptions include former New York State Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer's investigation of subprime lending disparities using 2004
HMDA data. 8 He subsequently brought and settled a claim against Countrywide
in 2006.19 Current New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo stated that
his office is planning to investigate subprime mortgage lenders. 2' Between January
1, 2004, and June 30, 2007, the four federal banking regulatory agencies referred 134
2
potential discrimination cases to the Department of Justice for investigation. 1
However, the Department has not filed any cases.
Private enforcement efforts have also been slow to develop, but recently the efforts have accelerated. For example, the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. The complaint alleged that Allied Home Mortgage Capital
Corporation often steered minority mystery shoppers to subprime loans even though
they were qualified for prime loans and referred white mystery shoppers to prime
loans. 22 In July 2007, the NAACP filed a class action lawsuit against eleven mortgage lenders, alleging that African-Americans received a higher percentage of
subprime loans than whites. 23 These lenders include Ameriquest, Fremont Investment
and Loan, Option One, WMC Mortgage, Long Beach Mortgage, BNC Mortgage,
Accredited Home Lenders, Encore Credit, First Franklin Financial, HSBC Finance,
24
and Washington Mutual, several of which are major lenders in New York City.
B. Impact on Solutions to the Subprime Lending Crisis
The second significant issue is the effect the findings of racially disproportionate
subprime lending should have on proposed solutions to the subprime lending crisis.
Discriminatory subprime lending means that borrowers who were eligible for prime
loans received subprime loans, resulting in more subprime loans than there should
18.

See Ameet Sachdev, Bias Probe Looks at HouseboldAcquirer'sLoan Pricing, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 2005, at

C1.
Dec. 6, 2006, at 1.

19.

Kate Berry, Countrywide Spitzer Deala Disclosure Precedent?,AM.

20.

Karen Freifeld, N.Y PlansProbe ofHigh-Risk Lenders, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2007, at D01.

21.

Cheyenne Hopkins, HMDA Suits Backdropfor Committee Hearings ClassActions Mount; "Exactly What
the Industry" Had Feared,AM. BANKER, July 25, 2007, at 1 (noting that three out of the four banking
regulatory agencies-the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Federal Reserve, and the Office of
Thrift Supervision-referred cases to the Justice Department).

22.

Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal. v. Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp. (June 14, 2006), available at
http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press releases/documents/2006/HUDComplaint.pdf. "Mystery
shoppers" are individuals who pose as loan applicants in order to gather information about loans to
compare how lenders treat applicants of different races.

23.

Bob Tedeschi, The N.A.A.C.P.vs. 11 Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 11, at 12.

24.

Id.
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be. In the long run, eliminating or reducing discriminatory subprime lending should
reduce the number of subprime loans and the negative collateral consequences they
create, including default and foreclosure. In the short term, programs that would
bail out or otherwise assist borrowers who are having trouble paying back subprime
loans by, for example, refinancing them at affordable rates, face opposition on the
grounds that borrowers are at least partially at fault. Opponents argue that bailing
out such borrowers would not deter future borrowers from accepting risky loans.
However, if borrowers received subprime loans because lenders exploited the lack of
traditional banks in predominantly minority neighborhoods, targeted them for subprime loans, or steered them toward subprime loans, the borrower's culpability is
eliminated. This, in turn, might make it easier to pass programs that assist such borrowers.
V.

CONCLUSION

The HMDA data for New York City show subprime lending disparities based on
race that are high enough for government agencies to exercise their enforcement authority and for private parties to exercise their rights and identify and eliminate
discriminatory subprime lending. Additionally, policymakers should consider these
results when considering both long and short term solutions to the subprime lending
crisis. Eliminating discriminatory subprime lending should help in the long term to
reduce subprime lending and the subsequent defaults and other negative consequences. In the short term, recognizing that many borrowers who received subprime
loans were eligible for prime loans could reduce resistance to short term solutions
such as borrower refinance programs.
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